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PRINCIPLES
OF AMERICAN POLICY
IN RELATION TO THE FAR EAST

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PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN POLICY— IN RELATION TO THE FAR EAST¹

Your committee did me the honor to ask that I give you a “factual statement on the foreign policy of the United States as it relates to the Far Eastern situation.” I replied that I would be glad to attempt to make a statement with regard to *principles* of American policy—in relation to the Far East. The reason for my making what might be called in the language of business or diplomacy a “counter proposal” was that, having tried many times to do so, I find it quite impossible to describe the policy of the United States as it relates to the Far Eastern situation as a thing apart. Moreover, the so-called “Far Eastern situation” is constantly changing.

Policy has to be considered either from point of view of principles or point of view of execution. It is necessary to distinguish clearly—although it is not possible at all times and in all connections to draw a line—between principles of policy and execution of policy. “Policy” is a term designative of attitude, desire, objective, and intention. Execution of policy is a matter of expression: it relates to, and involves, plans, courses of action, agencies, instruments, strategy, and tactics: operations. In *principles* of policy we have something more permanent, something broader and deeper, something on which policy rests and by which it is guided.

For those reasons and for others which will be apparent as we proceed, it seems to me more practicable and useful to try to indicate what are the principles of a policy than to attempt to give an account of “operations” in relation to a constantly changing situation.

¹ Address delivered by Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, before the Ninth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, at the Washington Hotel, Washington, D.C., Jan. 18, 1934.

I do not come as nor would I pose as one able to speak with "authority" or with any degree of finality. I am studying this subject—just as you and others are studying it. In what I shall say, I am not speaking for the Government, nor am I expressing views as from, of, or for the Department of which it is my privilege to be an officer. For what I shall say, I alone will be responsible. I shall make some affirmations to which there may not be universal assent. I shall suggest some questions to which only the future can give the answers. I would ask that you keep in mind the subject. I shall try to keep to it. I shall try to make my statement objective. It follows that as far as possible I shall avoid expressing opinion, especially opinion within the realm of moral or political appraisals.

Think, then, of policy, and in particular of principles of policy.

On the basis of a good deal of consideration of the subject I have long been of the opinion that the principles of American policy in relation to the Far East are in no way separate or distinct from those which underlie the foreign policy of the United States in general.

It therefore seems necessary to ask what are the principles of our foreign policy in general. And to know and understand these we must ask first: What are their sources?

I. SOURCES OF POLICY

1. Foreign policy is a living thing. It grows. It is not unlike a tree. It has roots in the soil from which it springs. It has a trunk, branches, and leaves in the atmosphere in which it becomes visible and where it affects and is affected by the thousand and one factors of its environment. From the soil it draws most of its substance. From the atmosphere and its general environment above ground it derives factors which contribute to the determination of its size, its shape, and other qualities.

In this country, policy has its roots in the minds and hearts of the people who constitute the Nation. Thence it draws most of its substance. The Nation is an aggregation of 125,000,000 persons. The thought, the attitude, and the objectives of the Nation are products of heredity and environment. Not all of the people are articulate, but every one of them has some influence upon the making of policy. The influence of many of us, at any moment, may be, it is true, merely or almost negative, but nevertheless, even so, it has an effect.

Under our Constitution sovereignty resides in the people. The people elect the legislators who make the laws and the principal executive officials who administer them. The Government, any administration, may lead or may follow public opinion; but it does not go far ahead of, it does not lag far behind, and it cannot in any major matter proceed in disregard of the attitude or inclination of the Nation as a whole.

It is the first business of the Government of the United States to safeguard and promote the interests of the people of the United States. These interests are both domestic and foreign, they are both national and international. Who decides what they shall be? Who decides what the attitude of the United States toward their safeguarding and promotion shall be? Who decides what agencies shall be employed in expression of that attitude? Who, by control—through the legislature—of the purse and of the power to declare or to refuse to declare war, decides what strength and what authority these agencies shall have and in what direction and how far they shall move? The answer to each and all of these questions is, it seems to me: The American people.

Mr. Kellogg said aptly several years ago:

“Let us get it clearly in mind, then, that the foreign policy of a country is a slow growth. * * *

“If you want to know what it is at a given moment, you must take into account * * * the whole history of the country as far as its international relations are concerned. For there cannot be a bit of doubt that we do have a foreign policy * * * one that is not the work of any individual or of any Administration, simply the traditional and historically developed policy of the United States which every Secretary of State strives faithfully to interpret and to apply.”

2. What, then, has been the history of the United States? It has been that of several streams of emigration from European countries into a land of vast extent and great resources; of the occupation of that land and the development of its resources; of the making of a new Nation; of the taking by that Nation of a place in the family of nations; and of advance by that Nation into a place among the leading nations of the world.

This Nation is made up of men and women descended from ancestors within whom, for one reason or another, there developed the urge to seek a greater measure of freedom and larger opportunities than were afforded them in the lands of their birth, who were willing to take the risks and endure the hardships of leaving the soil and the society in which they had grown up, who sought and found a new environment, who had the courage and the capacity to create and to maintain a new society.

For the most part, the people who came as colonists to central North America came with no thoughts of conquest. They came to found homes; they sought opportunity to live in freedom and, if possible, in comfort. They wanted peace. Yet they fought. They conquered men and they conquered nature. They took lands; they built; they created commonwealths. Their descendants fought—for their national independence. They made of the States which their fathers had created a Union. The next generation fought—to enforce respect for the rights of their country as an

independent member of the family of nations. A later generation fought—to decide whether the Union should endure. Our own generation has fought—on behalf of the principle that states and peoples shall be permitted to live their own lives in security and in peace.

The American people have fought—for opportunity, for national existence, for principles, for peace. Otherwise, however, they have been very busy for 3 centuries with problems relating to the creation and maintenance of an independent state and a free citizenry. Until recently, their chief concerns have been agriculture, transportation, mining, manufacturing, trade—and education. Their chief interests have been domestic.

However, having as a nation rounded out their continental frontiers, having made of their country a world power, and having during the last 3 decades overcome or been deprived of their national aloofness, the American people have been brought in the present generation right up against certain age-old problems in international relations.

It is a habit of the American people, when they come in contact with problems, to try to do something about them. Already the American people have taken a position in the forefront among the nations in the desire to contribute constructively to the solution of some of these problems. And one of those problems is that of world peace.

3. Judge John Bassett Moore has emphasized the point that the keynote of the foreign policy of the United States from the outset was “freedom founded on law”. There has prevailed among the American people the concept that, whether or not all men are “born free and equal”, all men should have free opportunity for self-realization. Translated into the political field, this means that laws should not be discriminatory, that laws should in fact provide for and as far as possible insure equality of opportunity. Projecting this concept into the field of international

relations, the American people have believed and continue to believe in principles which are expressed in the formulae of "sovereignty", "independence", and "equality of opportunity".

Thus American foreign policy in general has been shaped by the belief of the American people that free states should remain free, that peace is or should be the norm in human relationships, and that important among the conditions essential to enjoyment and maintenance of peace are respect by all states for the rights of other states and fair treatment by every state of those who live within or come within its jurisdiction. In the realm of formulated effort, the principal major objectives of American foreign policy since the earliest days of the Republic have been, first, to safeguard this country's position as a free and sovereign state and, second, to obtain for American nationals and American trade assurance of equal opportunity and fair treatment in every place to which American citizens, American ships, and American goods may choose to go.

In recent years, however, there has been added a new objective. This Nation, now potentially stronger than any other, has become deeply impressed by the concept of world peace. Be this attributable to inherited liberalism or to acquired conservatism, to expanding altruism or to change of circumstances; whatever the hows and wherefores; whether for good or for bad, for better or for worse, this is, apparently, a fact.

4. The contemporary effort to deal with the problem of peace is one of the great developments of the post-war period. Nations are talking peace. Statesmen are endeavoring to create machinery for maintaining peace. However, that effort can have little effect unless at the same time the conditions of life of men and nations be so altered, so improved, that the irritants and incentives which occasion resort to force disappear. Statesmen may devise all

sorts of machinery; but the conditions which will make it possible for peace machinery to function effectively must be produced by the common effort of many peoples. That problem is a world problem. It has caught the imagination—if not yet the hard thought—of the American people. And to the challenge of that problem the people of this country are more and more turning their attention.

Hence the American Government during recent administrations has directed toward that objective much of its thought and effort in the realm of foreign policy.

5. The makers of this country fought for a national existence and national security. Do the American people in the present generation understand that these can be maintained only at a price? Are they willing to pay the necessary price for their assurance? They now wish for world peace. Do they so ardently desire it that they will be willing to contribute their share of a fair price for its attainment? We were told in 1918 that we were fighting to “make the world safe for democracy”. Would this country be willing to fight again—and perhaps repeatedly—toward that end? Can it by sheer moral force, intelligently directed, so conduct itself and so influence other nations as to attain that end without further fighting? To these questions the answers lie in the future.

6. In these facts and in the answers which may be given to these questions there is to be sought, in my opinion, knowledge and understanding of the principles which underlie the foreign policy of the United States.

II. EVOLUTION AND CONTENT OF POLICY

Probably the most common error made by those who discuss policy is that of failure to distinguish between principles and execution. Principles are a reflection of the thought and the desires of the Nation. Execution relates to application, in action, of principles. The governments, the administrations, the officials

responsible at any given moment for the conduct of affairs, find a great body of principles and a collection of practices in effect. Here they may make alterations—of addition, of subtraction, destructive or constructive. They may or may not make declaration of the principles and practices which will be employed in the conduct by them of foreign relations. For the most part, however, their task is that of execution. This involves formulation of plans of action, putting plans into operation, and meeting and dealing with situations and problems in existence or which arise. Incidentally, in political matters, what we call “action” may or may not involve activity. The making of a decision is a matter of action, whether the execution thereof requires activity or inactivity. In the latter case we have what is called “negative” action.

The “foreign policy of the United States” and the principles thereof are matters the general outlines and content of which are well understood by a considerable number of students. The attitude and the objectives of the Nation do not change greatly from month to month or from year to year; nor do they often change abruptly. Less well understood—and all too often confused with policy—are what may be called the strategy and the tactics by which officials endeavor, during the comparatively short periods for which, in succession, they are in office, to execute policy. Here there is variety, here there may be substantial and often comparatively abrupt changes, from administration to administration, or even during one administration.

For present purposes we are not considering strategy and tactics. Often, however, not only principles of policy but substantial elements of strategy and tactics are disclosed in public statements or in communications which are made public.

I should like to ask that you look with me at a few documents, or parts thereof, which,

though drafted by or uttered or issued by individuals, are expressive of the attitude and intent of the American people in the field of foreign relations. There will be apparent indications not only of the sources but of the content of our foreign policy, together with some examples of strategy and tactics.

For this purpose we must begin, naturally, by referring to Washington's Farewell Address. In his "Last Words to the People of the United States", on September 27, 1796, Washington, addressing "Friends and Fellow Citizens", said, in part:

"The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. * * *

"Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. * * *

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? * * *

"'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world; * * *

"Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, in a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

"Harmony and a liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; * * * constantly keeping in view, that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; * * *"

How much have we, in the course of a hundred and thirty-seven years, added to and how much have we subtracted from facts underlying and the idea expressed in that statement?

a. In his annual message of December 2, 1823, President Monroe made, after prompting from various quarters and on the basis of a Cabinet discussion, certain pronouncements in declaration of policy—whence the so-called “Monroe Doctrine”. In the course of these, there appeared statements as follows:

“* * * the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

“* * * We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. * * *

“* * * Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. * * *”

In what I have quoted we find an almost complete statement of the fundamental principles of the Latin American policy of the United States; and more even than that: a fairly broad statement of the fundamental principles of what might be called our “European policy” and even of our foreign policy in general. All of this was an enunciation by one

man—the man, however, who was at the moment the President of the United States—of views which had developed among and which were held by the people whose spokesman he was. And these views appear still to be held, for the most part, by the people of the United States.

b. Now turn to another part of the world, the Far East.

That which is called “American Far Eastern policy” has grown from and has been shaped by the belief of the American people that free states should remain free—in the Orient as elsewhere—and that nations should live and let live with due respect for the rights and interests of one another. In regard to all parts of the Far East, the American people have viewed with disapproval tendencies—where manifested—toward imperialistic angling in troubled waters. Also, they naturally have assumed that they themselves have there, as elsewhere, certain rights and in connection with them certain obligations. These conceptions the American Government has translated into statements and action, in one administration after another, and the resultant policy has grown consistently.

When our diplomatic relations with China began, the first and principal positive objective of American official action in regard to China was—as it had been and has been elsewhere—to assure for American nationals a fair and equal opportunity to trade, but with due respect for the rights of the Chinese as an organized nation in a sovereign state. In 1842 Commodore Kearny, of the U.S.S. *Constellation*, addressed to the Governor of Canton a communication in which he asked that citizens of the United States in their trade should “be placed upon the same footing as the merchants of the nation most favored.” In 1843, in his letter to the Emperor, President Tyler said, among other things: “Our Minister, Caleb Cushing, is authorized to make a treaty to

regulate trade. Let it be just. Let there be no unfair advantage on either side. * * *

The most important provision—although not the most distinctive—in the treaty which Cushing concluded with China, in 1844, was the provision for most-favored-nation treatment.

In the period of the Taiping rebellion, Humphrey Marshall, American Commissioner, took the position: “* * * it is my purpose to perform, punctiliously, every obligation assumed by the United States under the treaty, and to refrain from embarrassing the public administration of Chinese affairs by throwing unnecessary obstacles in the way.” The American Government was of the same mind: its policy became that of respecting China’s sovereignty and helping the Chinese authorities to maintain the integrity of the Empire.

Shortly thereafter, although Americans in China, including officials, merchants, and some missionaries, urged that the United States cooperate with certain other countries in the use of force against Imperial China, the American Government refused to do so. Sixty years later, in 1927, this country declined to take part in a proposed joint show of force by several powers in support of demands upon the newly created Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.

In 1868, in the so-called Burlingame Treaty, for the negotiation of which the Chinese Government had chosen as its plenipotentiary a distinguished American, the American Government expressly agreed that the sovereign rights of China and the principle of equal opportunity “in trade or navigation within the Chinese dominions” were to be respected.

It remained for John Hay to formulate in 1899 the proposal that, in reference to their “spheres of interest” in China, the powers should follow, with regard to each other and to the world in general, the principle of equality of commercial opportunity; and to suggest in

1900 that the powers pledge themselves to respect China's territorial and administrative entity.

In September and November 1899, Hay, then Secretary of State, sent to the diplomatic representatives of the United States at London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, and Rome instructions to advise the governments to which they were respectively accredited of the hope that they would make "formal declaration of an 'open door' policy in the territories held by them in China." Certain express pledges of self-denial were sought. In due course favorable replies were received from all the governments addressed. Having in hand and having compared the replies, Hay, on March 20, 1900, sent instructions to each of the above-mentioned representatives of the United States to inform the government to which he was accredited that, inasmuch as it had accepted the declaration suggested by the United States and as like action had been taken by all the various powers concerned, the condition of common acceptance having been complied with, the United States Government would consider the assent given as final and definite. In other words, Hay declared that in his opinion each of these six powers had entered with the United States into a mutual declaration of intention to preserve the commercial *status quo* in China and to refrain, each in what might be its sphere of interest, from measures calculated to destroy equality of commercial opportunity.

But there was more to follow. In the spring of 1900 the Boxer movement threw the affairs of China and the possibilities as to her immediate future into the melting pot. While the attack on the legations was still in progress, Hay, on July 3, 1900, sent a circular telegram to the diplomatic representatives of the United States at 11 capitals, declaring:

"In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as present circum-

stances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives and property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under extraterritorial treaty rights and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability. We regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual anarchy, whereby power and responsibility are practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. So long as they are not in overt collusion with rebellion and use their power to protect foreign life and property, we regard them as representing the Chinese people, with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship. The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other Powers; first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is of course too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

"You will communicate the purpose of this instruction to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
HAY."

In that note we have mention of "attitude", "policy", "purpose", and "means". The basic principles in that statement were (1) protection of American lives, property, and legitimate interests; and (2) respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of China. Could one find a more succinct statement—in terms applicable not only to the

situation and problems of that moment but to a progressively troublesome situation and an enduring problem?

In various ways each of the powers addressed indicated or intimated that it intended to be governed by the same or similar principles.

The "Hay notes" thus carried a step further the idea which had been expressed by representatives of the American Government from time to time during a period of 60 years preceding. Also they added an idea, that of co-operation among the powers in a course of self-denial and self-restraint in pursuance of those principles. And they committed to these principles the United States and those of the other principal powers most concerned.

c. Twenty-two years after the Hay notes, there came action whereby there were given to some of the fundamental principles of the Far Eastern policy of the United States greater definition and more positive general subscription. At the Washington Conference, with the American Government playing a leading part and its Secretary of State, the present Chief Justice, Mr. Hughes, wielding a great influence, the powers principally concerned committed themselves in formal treaties and resolutions to certain prescribed courses of action, some positive and some negative, in regard to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean.

In one of these, the "Treaty relating to Principles and Policies concerning China", we find in the preamble a statement that the nine countries engaged in conference, "Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity; Have resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose * * *." In the articles of the treaty we find a solemnly concluded multilateral pledge on the part of the United States and (now) 13 other powers to respect China's integrity, to foster the principle

of equality of commercial opportunity in China, and to practice self-denial and self-restraint in relations with China.

In 1931 and 1932 another administration, that of President Hoover, vigorously championed the spirit and the letter of the pledges made in 1922. Whatever may be the analyst's view of the strategy and tactics which that administration employed, the statement of the Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, in declaration and exposition of the views and objectives of the United States, made public in the letter in reply to an inquiry from Senator Borah, based in considerable part on the Washington Conference treaties and another treaty of later date, was widely approved in this country and evoked very favorable comment abroad.

d. Now, to another chapter. In the period between 1922 and 1931, statesmen of this and other countries had brought into existence a comprehensive multilateral agreement, the Pact of Paris, the "Peace Treaty" of 1928, to which 63 states are now parties.

In this treaty we have an enunciation of a new principle, a declaration by the governments of the world, "in the names of their respective peoples", condemning recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renouncing it as an instrument of national policy; together with an agreement that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts which may arise among the parties shall "never be sought except by pacific means."

What does this combined declaration, renunciation, and pledge mean?

First of all, the text of that treaty must be viewed not by itself but in connection with the explanations made by or exchanged among the negotiators and with the reservations made by various governments in giving their ratifications. Already hundreds of articles and several whole volumes have been written in comment upon and exposition of the two substantive articles of this pact.

This much is certain: The tendency in this country is to take this treaty seriously. The desire for peace is generally prevalent in this country. The wish to see the spirit of the Pact of Paris prevail, together with the fact that we are favorably circumstanced, will probably render this country comparatively "strict" in its interpretation and application of its obligations under this pact. It may be assumed that the people of this country will not lightly resort to or approve of "war" or use of force in ways approximating war. It may further be assumed that they will be adversely disposed toward any proposals tending toward involving this country in commitments contemplating use of force.

Speaking of the proposal to add sanctions to the Pact of Paris, President Hoover said, on April 14, 1930:

"The nations of Europe, surrounded by the dangers and problems of which we in the Western Hemisphere have but little appreciation, and beset by inherited fears, hold to the view that, aside from the World Court, the pacific settlement of controversies and the maintenance of peace should be backed by potential coercion through pooling of either military or economic strength. We do not question their right to come to such conclusions as they see fit to follow, arising as they do from their terrible experience and their necessities. But the instinct of the vast majority of our people is that our contribution is not to be based upon commitments to use force to maintain peace.
* * * We have come to the belief that our contribution can best be made by our good offices and a helpfulness based upon independence from any combination pledge to use force. I believe it is clear that the United States can more effectively and wisely work for peace without commitments to use coercion to enforce settlements."

e. But what and how, if and when other countries choose to pursue courses which contravene what we consider to be our rights under the provisions of the Pact of Paris or other treaties?

For one answer to that question turn to a group of diplomatic communications and see a declaration of attitude, a policy, a doctrine in the making. I refer to the evolution of the so-called "doctrine" of "nonrecognition". I shall not go into that subject, for I understand that it has a place at another point in your program. I need only, for present purposes, call attention to the fact that the formula of nonrecognition has been employed by the American Government on several occasions, by several administrations, and in connection not only with developments in the Far East but with developments in Latin America. This formula gained world-wide attention when it was invoked in the identic notes addressed by the American Government to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on January 7, 1932, in connection with developments in Manchuria. Soon thereafter it was seized upon by the League of Nations, and it has been made by it the basis of several expressions of the attitude and intent of the League toward the use of force and situations brought about thereby.

Evidence in the field of action during the past year indicates that both the United States and the members of the League are acting—the type of action being that of refraining from certain acts—in conformity with the "non-recognition" formula and the declarations of intent which have attended its affirmation.

f. Turning to the question: What is the attitude of the United States with regard to the League of Nations? I am convinced, on the basis of considerable study of that question, that an adequate working conception can be gained by careful perusal of official correspondence made public during the past 3 years and of recent public utterances of President Roosevelt. In these there is evidence of the thought that the United States is willing and happy to co-operate with the League in pursuance of common objectives, but acting independently and through its own agencies, thus avoiding

involvement of this country in the functioning and processes of the League as such.

g. Now let us look at certain statements and acts of the present administration.

g-1. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt touched upon foreign policy in a paragraph which reads:

“In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.”

g-2. In an address delivered on Pan American Day, April 12, 1933, President Roosevelt referred to the statement in his inaugural address with regard to “the policy of the good neighbor” and continued:

“Never have the need and benefit of neighborly cooperation in every form of human activity been so evident as they are today.

“Friendship among nations, as among individuals, calls for constructive efforts to muster the forces of humanity in order that an atmosphere of close understanding and cooperation may be cultivated. It involves mutual obligations and responsibilities, for it is only by sympathetic respect for the rights of others and a scrupulous fulfillment of the corresponding obligations by each member of the community that a true fraternity can be maintained.

* * * * *

“Your Americanism and mine must be a structure built of confidence, cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only equality and fraternity. It finds its source and being in the hearts of men and dwells in the temple of the intellect.”

g-3. On May 16, 1933, President Roosevelt addressed directly to the heads of all countries a circular telegram, the opening sentence of which reads:

“A profound hope of the people of my country impels me, as the head of their government, to address you and, through you, the people of your nation. This hope is that peace

may be assured through practical measures of disarmament and that all of us may carry to victory our common struggle against economic chaos."

There are in that message statements of theory, statements of fact, and suggestions for a common course of action. Scrutiny of that message suggests that the people of the United States, President Roosevelt being now their spokesman, feel that the nations of the world must "supplement individual domestic programs for economic recovery, by wise and considered international action"; feel that world peace is desirable; feel that disarmament will contribute toward the achievement of world peace; feel that the conference method is the practical method by which to proceed; feel that the use of force in international relations should be restricted to use in self-defense; feel that the nations should be committed to such a restriction; and feel that international cooperation is desirable and can be brought about.

g-4. On October 10, 1933, President Roosevelt sent a communication in the form of a letter to Mikhail Kalinin, President of the All Union Central Executive Committee, Moscow. On October 17, President Kalinin replied. On November 16, 1933, in Washington, there were exchanged between the President of the United States and Maxim M. Litvinoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a group of communications, in one of which President Roosevelt stated:

"I am very happy to inform you that as a result of our conversations the Government of the United States has decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to exchange ambassadors."

The communications exchanged in this connection should be read and scrutinized by all who wish comprehensively to understand the broad implications of the dedication of this country to the "policy of the good neighbor".

g-5. In President Roosevelt's Thanksgiving proclamation, on November 21, 1933, there appeared a paragraph as follows:

"May we recall the courage of those who settled a wilderness, the vision of those who founded the nation, the steadfastness of those who in every succeeding generation have fought to keep pure the ideal of equality of opportunity and hold clear the goal of mutual help in time of prosperity as in time of adversity."

g-6. On November 24, 1933, President Roosevelt issued from Warm Springs, Ga., a statement with regard to Cuba. Among other things he said:

"* * * we have followed the course of events in Cuba with a most friendly concern and with a consistent desire to be of help to the Cuban people.

* * * * *

"We feel that no official action of the United States should at any time operate as an obstacle to the free and untrammelled determination by the Cuban people of their own destinies.

"We have been keenly desirous during all this period of showing by deed our intention of playing the part of a good neighbor to the Cuban people. . * * *

"* * * the Government of the United States * * * will welcome any provisional government in Cuba in which the Cuban people demonstrate their confidence. * * *"

g-7. On the same date, November 24, 1933, the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, in a statement made upon his arrival at Rio de Janeiro, said, among other things:

"* * * Peace must be our passion. Its cost cannot be too great in the light of the frightful cost of war. * * * So we must take stock of all our blessings in this favored part of the world * * * and bring them to bear, by united efforts, to help right a topsy-turvy civilization. * * * By being the best of good neighbors let us offer the finest possible example for a jaded and disillusioned world."

g-8. At the Montevideo Conference, on December 19, 1933, there was introduced a proposal declaring: "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." The American Delegation voted in favor of this along with other proposals, subject to the terms of a statement and declaration in which Secretary of State Hull said, in part:

"The policy and attitude of the United States Government toward every important phase of international relationships in this hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite than they have been made by both word and action, especially since March 4. * * * Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt administration the United States Government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations.

"* * * the United States Government in all of its international associations and relationships and conducts will follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies which it has pursued since March 4 which are embodied in the different addresses of President Roosevelt since that time and in the recent peace address of myself on the 15th day of December before this Conference and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted."

g-9. In his address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation on December 28, 1933, President Roosevelt said, in part:

"In that speech in Mobile, President Wilson first enunciated the definite statement 'that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.' The United States accepted that declaration of policy. President Wilson went further, pointing out with special reference to our Latin American neighbors that material interests must never be made superior to human liberty.

* * * * *

"It therefore has seemed clear to me as President that the time has come to supplement and to implement the declaration of President Wilson by the further declaration that the

definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.

"* * * It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors.

* * * * *

"Today the United States is cooperating openly in the fuller utilization of the League of Nations machinery than ever before.

"I believe that I express the views of my countrymen when I state that the old policies, alliances, combinations, and balances of power have proved themselves inadequate for the preservation of world peace. The League of Nations, encouraging as it does the extension of nonaggression pacts, of reduction of armament agreements, is a prop in the world peace structure.

"We are not members and we do not contemplate membership. We are giving cooperation to the League in every matter which is not primarily political and in every matter which obviously represents the views and the good of the peoples of the world as distinguished from the views and the good of political leaders, of privileged classes, or of imperialistic aims.

* * * * *

"I have said to every nation in the world something to this effect:

(At this point the President repeated certain of the suggestions which he had made in his circular telegram of May 14, 1933, to the heads of states. He suggested elimination of weapons of offense and a general declaration that "no nation will permit any of its armed forces to cross its own borders into the territory of another nation." And he continued:)

"3. It is clear, of course, that no such general agreement for the elimination of aggression and of the weapons of offensive warfare would be of any value to the world unless every nation, without exception, entered into the agreement by solemn obligation. If, then, such an agreement were signed by a great majority of the nations on the definite condition that it would go into effect only when signed by all the nations, it would be a comparatively

easy matter to determine which nations in this enlightened time are willing to go on record as belonging to the small minority of mankind which still believes in the use of the sword for invasion of and attack upon their neighbors.

"I did not make this suggestion until I felt assured, after a hard-headed practical survey, that the temper of the overwhelming majority of all men and women in my own country as well as those who make up the world's population, subscribes to the fundamental objective I have set forth and to the practical road to that objective. * * *"

g-10. In the course of his message to Congress on January 3, 1934, President Roosevelt said:

"The delegation representing the United States has worked in close cooperation with the other American republics assembled at Montevideo to make that conference an outstanding success. We have, I hope, made it clear to our neighbors that we seek with them future avoidance of territorial expansion and of interference by one nation in the internal affairs of another. Furthermore, all of us are seeking the restoration of commerce in ways which will preclude the building up of large favorable trade balances by any one nation at the expense of trade debits on the part of other nations.

"In other parts of the world, however, fear of immediate or future aggression and with this the spending of vast sums on armament, and the continued building up of defensive trade barriers, prevent any great progress in peace or trade agreements. I have made it clear that the United States cannot take part in political arrangements in Europe but that we stand ready to cooperate at any time in practicable measures on a world basis looking to immediate reduction of armaments and the lowering of the barriers against commerce."

SUMMARY

In the light of this survey, it seems to me possible to suggest that the outstanding principles of American foreign policy in general,

and therefore of our policy in relation to the Far East, are substantially as follows:

(a) In regard to rights and obligations, respect for the rights of other states and peoples—with expectation of respect by them for our rights; and performance of our obligations toward other states—with expectation of performance by them of their obligations toward us;

(b) In regard to American nationals and interests abroad, safeguarding of life and protection and promotion of legitimate interests—by lawful, appropriate, and practicable methods;

(c) In the field of political method, abstention from action and from commitments involving or tending to involve the United States in situations, controversies, or conflicts in which the rights, obligations, and interests of this country are not at stake; but cooperation with other powers when and where, for the safeguarding of a common interest or toward attainment of a common objective, cooperation seems appropriate, practicable, and lawful;

(d) In the field of diplomatic endeavor, reliance upon processes of discussion, negotiation, agreement, arbitration, and adjudication;

(e) In the field of military action, use of force only for the purpose of preventing or combating unlawful use of force by others imminently imperiling the lives and legitimate interests of American nationals or the integrity of American soil, and then only under authority of and as prescribed by law—including national and international law and treaties and recognized common convention; and

(f) In all connections, conscious and constant effort to be a “good neighbor”.



